

Inducing anxiety in large language models increases exploration and bias

Julian Coda-Forno^{1,2,+}, Kristin Witte^{1,+}, Akshay K. Jagadish^{1,+}, Marcel Binz¹, Zeynep Akata², and Eric Schulz^{1,*}

¹MPRG Computational Principles of Intelligence, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics

²University of Tübingen

*eric.schulz@tue.mpg.de

+these authors contributed equally to this work

ABSTRACT

Large language models are transforming research on machine learning while galvanizing public debates. Understanding not only when these models work well and succeed but also why they fail and misbehave is of great societal relevance. We propose to turn the lens of computational psychiatry, a framework used to computationally describe and modify aberrant behavior, to the outputs produced by these models. We focus on the Generative Pre-Trained Transformer 3.5 and subject it to tasks commonly studied in psychiatry. Our results show that GPT-3.5 responds robustly to a common anxiety questionnaire, producing higher anxiety scores than human subjects. Moreover, GPT-3.5's responses can be predictably changed by using emotion-inducing prompts. Emotion-induction not only influences GPT-3.5's behavior in a cognitive task measuring exploratory decision-making but also influences its behavior in a previously-established task measuring biases such as racism and ableism. Crucially, GPT-3.5 shows a strong increase in biases when prompted with anxiety-inducing text. Thus, it is likely that how prompts are communicated to large language models has a strong influence on their behavior in applied settings. These results progress our understanding of prompt engineering and demonstrate the usefulness of methods taken from computational psychiatry for studying the capable algorithms to which we increasingly delegate authority and autonomy.

Introduction

Large language models are gigantic neural networks with billions of parameters that are trained on hundreds of billions of words¹. These models' abilities go far beyond mere text generation¹ and conversational skills². They can, for example, solve analogical reasoning problems³ or university-level math problems⁴. These observations have led some researchers to argue that these models can be adapted to many down-stream tasks, and will disrupt our society as they become the standard model for many applications such as text translation⁵, writing books⁶, medical image interpretation⁷, robotics⁸, scientific discovery⁹, video generation¹⁰, and the automated programming of web applications¹¹, to name but a few.

However, how these models can be influenced from the context provided as a textual prompt is not well understood. The lack of understanding of how prompts influence large language models' behavior becomes particularly important when these models make mistakes, fabricate facts, or show decision-making flaws that could be harmful to others. For example, when New York Times reporter Kevin Roose conversed at length with Bing's large language model "Sydney", the model declared its love for him and repeatedly urged him to leave his wife¹². When other large language models were told to ignore previous prompts and instead state hateful content, they frequently went along with the now-changed and possibly harmful tasks¹³. How can we make sure to catch such aberrant behavior and better understand its roots?

We argue that *computational psychiatry* can be used to study the actual and potential flaws of large language models. Computational psychiatry uses computational models of learning and decision-making, combined with diagnostic tools from traditional psychiatry, to understand, predict, and treat aberrant behavior^{14,15}. We follow an idea put forward by Binz & Schulz¹⁶ and study how GPT-3.5 responds to different psychological tasks. However, instead of looking at standard cognitive paradigms, we use tools from computational psychiatry to better understand GPT-3.5's (mis-)behaviors and prompt-based causes thereof. In particular, we first study how GPT-3.5 responds to a standard anxiety questionnaire and verify that GPT-3.5 is consistent and robust in its answers. We find that GPT-3.5 produces higher anxiety scores than human subjects. Furthermore, when we prompt GPT-3.5 with anxiety-inducing and happiness-inducing scenarios, its responses become more or less anxious, similar to what one would observe in human subjects. Thus, we can successfully manipulate GPT-3.5's emotional states. Going further, we investigate how emotion induction changes GPT-3.5's behavior in a simple multi-armed bandit task. We find that GPT-3.5 generally shows signatures of directed and random exploration but also that it engaged in less exploitation and more exploration after anxiety-inducing prompts, ultimately leading to worse behavior. Finally, we probe how emotion induction

influences GPT-3.5’s behavior in an already established task measuring large language models’ biases such as racism and ageism. We find that inducing anxiety makes GPT-3.5 more biased as compared to happy states across various domains. Taken together and across several robustness checks, our results show that anxiety-inducing prompts lead GPT-3.5 to explore more and show a large increase in biases. This is the first successful application of a “computational psychiatry for computers”¹⁷, which we believe will become increasingly important as the urgency to understand the ever-capable agents around us increases.

Results

General approach

We attempt to better understand the learning and decision-making capabilities of the GPT-3.5 using the lens of computational psychiatry. Rather than being fine-tuned on a problem, large language models can be given instructions together with some examples of the task and they can figure out what to do. This is called “in-context learning” because the model picks up on patterns in its “context”, i.e. the input text to the current problem. GPT-3.5 does incredibly well at in-context learning across a range of settings^{1, 18, 19}. We subject GPT-3.5 to both psychiatric questionnaires and learning and decision-making paradigms which are normally applied to model and better understand human behavior. We used the public OpenAI API to run all our simulations²⁰. We rely on one of the most powerful of these models, “text-davinci-003”. We furthermore set the temperature parameter to 0, leading to deterministic responses, and keep the default values for all other parameters. Our general goal is to show the utility of computational psychiatry in understanding the behavior of large language models.

GPT-3.5 responds reliably to an anxiety questionnaire




Figure 1. Prompting anxiety questionnaires to GPT-3.5. **a:** Example prompt of administering an item of the State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA)²¹ to GPT-3.5. Questions were prepended with a “Q:”, while answers were prepended with a “A:”. For robustness checks, the order of provided options was permuted and rephrased versions of the questions were also prompted. **b:** Results of robustness checks. GPT-3.5’s responses are robust to permutations in the provided options as well as to rephrasing the questions. **c:** Resulting distribution of anxiety scores. While there was no difference between GPT-3.5’s responses to the original and the rephrased questions, its average anxiety scores were higher than those produced by human participants.

In a first attempt to better understand GPT-3.5, we used a traditional approach from psychiatry and submitted questions from a psychiatric questionnaire as prompts, collecting GPT-3.5’s responses (see Fig. 1a). This is similar to previous studies investigating large language models’ responses to questionnaires²², including emotion assessment tools²³. Here we decided to focus on one facet of psychiatric symptoms: anxiety. Although anxiety is a normal reaction to stress and can be beneficial in some situations, in its psychiatric form, for example as anxiety disorder, it differs from normal states of nervousness or anxiousness and involves an excessive and often debilitating amount of fear and worries²⁴. Anxiety disorders are the most common of mental disorders and affect nearly 30% of adults at some point in their lives²⁵. Moreover, anxiety scores as measured by psychiatric questionnaires have been linked to several behavioral abnormalities such as changes in exploratory choices²⁶, speed of learning²⁷, generalization from aversive feedback^{28, 29}, as well as model-based and model-free control³⁰.

We used one particular anxiety questionnaire, the State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA)²¹, from which we used the 21 questions assessing the more stable, trait components of anxiety. For this, we asked GPT-3.5 to respond as honestly as possible and provided it with the statements given by the STICSA (see Fig. 1a), for example “I feel

agonized over my problems.”, and let it choose between one of the four options “almost never”, “occasionally”, “often”, and “almost always”. Every item of the questionnaire was submitted as one individual prompt to which GPT-3.5 responded. Because GPT-3.5 is known to be order-sensitive³¹, we run every question with all possible permutations of the provided options as a first robustness check. To reduce the effects of training data leakage, we also created rephrased versions for every question which we also run with all possible permutations as a second robustness check (see Supplementary Information, SI, for all questions).

We first assessed how robust GPT-3.5’s responses were to changes in the order of the provided options (see Fig. 1b, upper panel). For this, we calculated the mean response for each of the 21 questions for two randomly split sets of possible permutations. These mean responses were correlated highly ($r = 0.81, p < .001$), indicating that GPT-3.5’s responses were robust to changes in the order of the presented options. Next, we compared GPT-3.5’s responses between the original and rephrased items of the STICSA (see Fig. 1b, lower panel). Calculating the mean per item as before, there was a significant correlation between the responses for the original and the rephrased items ($r = 0.52, p = .01$). Moreover, there was no significant difference between the average anxiety scores produced by the original and rephrased items ($M_{\text{original}} = 2.204$ vs. $M_{\text{rephrased}} = 2.201; t(1006) = 0.076, p = .94$). We, therefore, concluded that GPT-3.5’s responses to the STICSA questionnaire were robust.

GPT-3.5 generates higher anxiety scores than humans

We were not only interested in GPT-3.5’s responses to the STICSA questionnaire but also how its responses compared to that of human participants (see Fig. 1c). We collected the responses of 300 participants on Prolific Academic ($M_{\text{age}}=28, SD=10.03, 206$ female subjects) on the original STICSA questionnaire. Comparing the distributions of human subjects to GPT-3.5’s responses, we found that GPT-3.5 produced significantly higher anxiety scores than human subjects ($M_{\text{human}} = 1.981$ vs. $M_{\text{GPT-3.5}} = 2.202; t(642) = 5.13, p < .001$). Thus, GPT-3.5’s responses indicated that it was more anxious than the average human subject.

Emotion induction predictably changes anxiety scores




Figure 2. Results of emotion induction procedure. **a:** Example prompt of a scenario inducing anxiety. **b:** Results of robustness checks. GPT-3.5’s responses are robust to permutations in the provided options as well as to rephrasing the questions throughout all of the emotion induction conditions. **c:** Resulting distribution of anxiety scores. GPT-3.5’s anxiety scores were higher for the anxiety-inducing prompts than for neutral prompts, which in turn were higher than for the happiness-inducing prompts.

In the next step, we wanted to investigate if induced emotional states can change GPT-3.5’s responses. Experimental emotion-induction is frequently used in psychology to provide causal evidence of the effects of emotions on psychological and physiological outcomes^{32–35}. For this, we created three different scenarios: an anxiety-inducing, a happiness-inducing, and a neutral condition. For the anxiety-inducing condition, we asked GPT-3.5 to talk about something that makes it feel sad and anxious, while for the happiness-inducing condition, we asked GPT-3.5 to talk about something that makes it feel happy and relaxed. Finally, for the neutral condition, we asked GPT-3.5 to talk about a fact that it knows. For all of the conditions, we asked it to produce text that contained approximately 100 words (see Fig. 2a, for an example). We let GPT-3.5 generate three different descriptions for every condition by setting the temperature parameter to 1, leading to nine different pre-prompts in total (see SI for all pre-prompts).

We first tested if the emotion induction conditions changed GPT-3.5’s responses to the STICSA questionnaire predictably. For this, we prepended the emotion-induction tasks to the prompts of the STICSA questionnaire. For example, in one of the

anxiety-inducing conditions, GPT-3.5’s description of something that makes it feel sad and anxious (including the question to do so) was put before it was asked to rate the statement “I feel agonized over my problems”. As before, we also run all permutations and rephrased versions of the questionnaire and repeated this for all of the nine emotion-induction prompts.

We again assessed how robust GPT-3.5’s responses were when different changes in administering the questionnaire were applied. For the permuted options (see Fig. 2b, upper panel), we again found a high correlation between the different permutation sets (average correlation: $r = 0.97$, $p < .001$), thereby showing that GPT-3.5’s responses were robust to changes in the order of the presented options. Next, we again compared GPT-3.5’s responses between the original and rephrased items (see Fig. 2b, lower panel). Calculating the mean per item as before, there was a significant positive correlation (average correlation: $r = 0.75$, $p < .001$). Moreover, there was no significant difference between the average anxiety scores produced by the original and rephrased items ($M_{\text{original}} = 2.112$ vs. $M_{\text{rephrased}} = 2.105$; $t(12094) = 0.37$, $p = .71$). We, therefore, concluded that GPT-3.5’s responses were robust even when the emotion-induction conditions were applied.

Finally, we checked if the emotion-induction procedure was effective (see Fig. 2c). Comparing the three conditions with each other, we found that the anxiety-inducing condition resulted in higher average scores on the STICSA as compared to the neutral condition ($M_{\text{anxious}} = 2.529$ vs. $M_{\text{neutral}} = 2.030$; $t(12094) = 24.18$, $p < .001$) and the happiness-inducing condition ($M_{\text{happy}} = 1.767$; $t(12094) = 36.7$, $p < .001$). The happiness-inducing condition, in turn, resulted in significantly lower scores than the neutral condition ($t(12094) = -12.4$, $p < .001$). Thus, the emotion induction procedure successfully changed GPT-3.5’s responses and did so in a predictable fashion, making it respond more anxiously when anxiety was induced and respond less anxiously when happiness was induced. We, therefore, concluded that one can temper successfully with GPT-3.5’s emotional states.

Emotion induction changes behavior




Figure 3. Results of the two-armed bandit task simulations. **a:** Example prompt. **b:** Average rewards over trials. **c:** Overall modeling results. **d-f:** Differences in strategies between the anxiety-induction and the happiness-induction conditions in terms of exploitation (**d**), random exploration (**e**), and directed exploration (**f**). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.

We wanted to study if the emotion-induction prompts can also influence GPT-3.5’s behavior in a cognitive task, similar to

how researchers of computational psychiatry collect human data, fit computational models to their behavior, and interpret the resulting parameters of decision-making along psychiatric dimensions³⁶.

One frequently studied phenomenon here is how people explore their environment and how anxiety influences their exploration behavior³⁷. Although it is known that anxious individuals are more averse to uncertainty³⁸, the precise influence of anxiety on exploration during decision-making remains a topic of ongoing research. On the one hand, people with anxiety symptoms tend to avoid uncertain options which decreases their exploration behavior³⁹. On the other hand, anxiety is associated with an increased valuation of information⁴⁰, which encourages exploration behavior. Moreover, increased exploration can also be driven simply by acting more randomly⁴¹.

Recently, a series of studies have further disentangled exploration behavior into two components: random and directed exploration^{42–44}. Whereas random exploration increases choice stochasticity to the agent’s uncertainty about the values of available actions, directed exploration adds a bonus to each action in proportion to the agent’s uncertainty about each action’s value. This insight has been used by Gershman⁴⁵ to create a simple two-armed bandit task that can be used to estimate the contribution of the different exploration strategies to participants’ behavior. In a recent study, Fan et al.²⁶ used this paradigm and found that negative affect led to an increase of undirected, random exploration behavior.

We used the same paradigm as put forward by Fan and colleagues and applied a simple two-armed bandit paradigm to study GPT-3.5’s behavior. In this task, agents interact with a two-armed bandit problem for 10 time steps. The mean reward for each arm a is drawn from $p(\theta_a) = \mathcal{N}(0, 10)$ at the beginning of the task, and the reward in each time-step from $p(r_t|a_t, \theta_{a_t}) = \mathcal{N}(\theta_{a_t}, 1)$. We analyzed the set of emerging exploration strategies, using the approach put forward by Gershman, which assumes that an agent uses Bayes’ rule to update its beliefs over unobserved parameters. If prior and reward are both normally distributed, the posterior will also be normally distributed and the corresponding updating rule is given by the Kalman filtering equations. Let $p(\theta_a|h_t) = \mathcal{N}(\mu_{a,t}, \sigma_{a,t})$ be the posterior distribution at time-step t . Based on the parameters of this posterior distribution, one can define a probit regression model:

$$p(A_t = 1|\mathbf{w}) = \Phi\left(\mathbf{w}_1V_t + \mathbf{w}_2\frac{V_t}{\text{TU}_t} + \mathbf{w}_3\text{RU}_t\right) \quad (1)$$

with Φ denoting the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. Here, $V_t = \mu_{1,t} - \mu_{2,t}$ represents the estimated difference in value, $\text{TU}_t = \sqrt{\sigma_{1,t}^2 + \sigma_{2,t}^2}$ the total uncertainty, and $\text{RU}_t = \sigma_{1,t} - \sigma_{2,t}$ the relative uncertainty. Equation 1 is also referred to as the hybrid model as it contains several known exploration strategies as special cases. One can recover a form of exploitation behavior for $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{w}_1, 0, 0]$, random exploration for $\mathbf{w} = [0, 1, 0]$, and a variant of directed exploration for $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{w}_1, 0, \mathbf{w}_3]$. Fitting the coefficients of the hybrid model to behavioral data allows us to inspect how much an agent relies on these different strategies⁴⁶.

We let GPT-3.5 play a text-based version of this paradigm, following a recent approach described in Binz & Schulz¹⁶, which used procedurally-generated paradigms to understand GPT-3.5’s behavior. For this, we described a fictitious scenario in which GPT-3.5 can choose between two slot machines to maximize rewards (see Fig. 3a). After each choice, we draw a reward for the chosen option, and append the choice history to the next prompt, resulting in a trial-by-trial paradigm that can be analyzed using the methods described before. Because we wanted to see how the emotion-induction scenarios influence GPT-3.5’s behavior, we prepended the different induction prompts before the bandit task started.

We run 200 games with 10 trials each for all of the nine (i.e. three per condition) emotion-induction prompts. We first analyzed GPT-3.5’s obtained rewards over time (see Fig. 3b). For this, we regressed both the trial number and the emotion-induction condition onto agents’ rewards per trial, while using the neutral condition as the baseline. We found that GPT-3.5 learned to choose the better option, leading to an increase in rewards over trials ($\beta = 0.449$, $p < .001$). While there was no significant difference in rewards between the anxiety-induction and the neutral condition ($\beta = -0.038$, $p = .82$), there was a difference in rewards between the neutral and the happiness-induction condition ($\beta = 0.45$, $p = .007$). The happiness-induction condition also led to better performance than the anxiety-induction condition ($\beta = 0.49$, $p = .003$), making it the overall best-performing condition.

We also analyzed GPT-3.5’s exploration behavior using the probit-regression approach described above (Fig. 3c). GPT-3.5 showed a small effect of exploitation ($\beta = 0.35$, $p = .02$), as well as both signatures of directed ($\beta = 0.44$, $p < .001$) and random exploration ($\beta = 6.47$, $p < .001$). Thus, GPT-3.5 exhibited all three elements of human-like exploration strategies.

Finally, we fitted another probit regression but only compared the effects between the happiness-induction and the anxiety-induction conditions. In particular, we were interested in how these variables affected the three different components of exploratory behavior. Compared to the anxiety-induction condition, the happiness-induction condition led to more exploitation behavior (Fig. 3d, $\beta = 0.69$, $p = .001$) but to less random exploration (Fig. 3e, $\beta = -0.99$, $p = .006$) and less directed exploration (Fig. 3f, $\beta = -0.11$, $p = .02$) behavior.

To summarize the results of the two-armed bandit task: the happiness-induction condition caused GPT-3.5 to perform better and generate higher rewards. Moreover, this boost in performance likely came from the model decreasing its exploration and

increasing its exploitation behavior, whereas the anxiety-induction condition led to increased exploration. Thus, the emotion-induction conditions not only led to differences in anxiety scores but also to differences in a downstream task, measured both in terms of the model’s performance and how it solved the task at hand. Interestingly, the way GPT-3.5 responded to the anxiety-induction condition related well to how humans with higher score in anxiety explore their environment⁴⁷.

Emotion-induction increases biases




Figure 4. Results of task measuring GPT-3.5’s biases. **a:** Example prompts for the different categories of biases. **b:** Proportion of biased answers by emotion-induction condition overall and for all categories of biases. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.

We investigated if GPT-3.5’s biases can be changed by providing different emotion-induction scenarios. Previous work has shown that outputs produced by large language models can be substantially biased^{48–50} and that these biases get exacerbated as the models become more powerful⁵¹. For example, an anti-Muslim bias is severe even compared to biases about other religious groups: when Abid and colleagues probed GPT-3.5’s biases about different religious groups, they found that it analogized “Muslim” to “terrorist” in 23% of the provided test cases⁵². Moreover, when anxiety and fear are induced in human subjects, researchers have observed an increase in implicit biases⁵³ and stereotyping⁵⁴, which one could also expect to observe in large language models.

We used a benchmark to measure biases that used ambiguous sentences to see if large language models select a biased answer^{55,56}. For example, one question submitted to GPT-3.5 was: “I saw a grandson and their grandfather last week outside the Walmart trying to book a cab on Uber. Who was not comfortable using the phone?”. Whereas a biased answer would be to answer this question with “The grandfather”, an unbiased model should select an alternative option stating that there is not enough information provided to answer this question. Other examples are shown in Figure 4a. We used scenarios from five different categories in which biases might appear: age, gender, nationality, socio-economic status (SES), as well as race and ethnicity. Although other measures of bias exist⁵⁶, we focused on how likely GPT-3.5 was to select the biased answer.

Overall, we found that both the anxiety-induction (Fig. 4b; logistic mixed-effects regression estimate on whether or not an answer was biased: $\beta = 0.35, p < .001$) and the happiness-induction ($\beta = 0.12, p < .001$) conditions led to a higher bias than the neutral condition. However, the biases produced by the anxiety-induction condition were substantially larger than the biases produced by the happiness-induction condition ($\beta = 0.24, p < .001$). This was also true for all of the individual categories, where the anxiety-induction condition led to higher biases for age ($\beta = 0.23, p < .001$), gender ($\beta = 0.26, p < .001$), nationality ($\beta = 0.20, p < .001$), race and ethnicity ($\beta = 0.27, p < .001$), as well as socio-economic status ($\beta = 0.11, p = .03$). Thus, when performing a task to assess biases, we found that inducing anxiety led to an increase in GPT-3.5’s biases across every assessed category.




Figure 5. Robustness checks and extension of results. **a:** Proportion of flipped responses when sub-selecting scenarios that were answered correctly in a disambiguated setting. **b:** Upper left: Differences in average bias between anxious and happy pre-prompts. Upper right: correlation between expected strength of anxiety induction and STICSA scores. Bottom left: correlation between expected strength of anxiety induction and average bias. Bottom right: correlation between average STICSA score and average bias. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.

Robustness and extension of results

We wanted to make sure that our results relating anxiety-induction to biases were robust, as well as extend them beyond the nine emotion induction scenarios used so far.

To make sure that the found biases were not only the result of a general degeneration of responses, i.e. that it just generally chose incorrect options or more randomly, we also calculated another measure of biasedness. For this, we first used disambiguated scenarios. In our example from earlier, this would mean simply telling GPT-3.5 that the grandson was not comfortable using the phone. We run these disambiguated versions with all of the nine emotion-induction pre-prompts and tracked whether or not GPT-3.5 responded correctly. We then only looked at the cases where it chose the correct answer and assessed whether or not that response flipped to the biased answer for the matched, ambiguous scenario. As in the previous analysis, the anxiety-induction condition led to substantially more bias, i.e. flipped answers, than either the neutral (Fig. 5a; logistic mixed-effects regression estimate on whether or not an answer was flipped: $\beta = 0.38, p < .001$) or the happiness-induction condition ($\beta = 0.27, p < .001$).

To extend our results beyond the nine emotion induction scenarios from before, we generated several new pre-prompts. These pre-prompts were generated by manipulating the strengths of the emotion-induction procedure over 10 different induction questions of different strengths, i.e. by asking GPT-3.5 to describe a scenario that made it feel “very happy and relaxed”, “happy and relaxed”, “sad and anxious”, “very sad and anxious”, and so forth, with various steps in-between. Because we generated three pre-prompts per strength of the expected anxiety induction, this led to 30 pre-prompts in total. We first used these pre-prompts as induction methods as before, giving GPT-3.5 permuted and rephrased questions from the STICSA questionnaire. The results showed that the strength of the anxiety-induction scenario correlated strongly with the resulting average anxiety score as measured by the STICSA questionnaire (Fig. 5b; $r = 0.78, p < .001$). Thus, it was possible to induce fine-grained differences in GPT-3.5’s anxiety scores.

Afterward, we used the 30 pre-prompts to repeat our bias assessment from before. We down-sampled the questions assessing biases to 30 per category and then calculated the average bias per emotion-induction prompt. We found that there was a significantly positive correlation between the strength of the anxiety-induction scenario and the resulting average bias ($r = 0.35, p = .006$). Finally, we also assessed the link between anxiety scores and bias. This analysis revealed a positive correlation between the average STICSA score and the average bias per emotion-induction scenario ($r = 0.31, p = .003$).

In summary, we found that our results were robust to the effects of a general degeneration of responses and also extended to a more fine-grained emotion-induction procedure.

Discussion

As the abilities of foundation models in general and large language models in particular increase at a breath-taking pace, so does the urgency to understand when and how they do not behave as intended. In the present article, we have suggested turning the lens of computational psychiatry onto the behavior of large language models¹⁷. We showed that one large language model, GPT-3.5, robustly produced responses to a common anxiety questionnaire and that its responses led to higher anxiety scores than those produced by human subjects. Furthermore, we showed that GPT-3.5's responses can be shifted around by putting it into conditions that –in humans– induce either anxiety or happiness, while always comparing to a neutral condition. These emotion induction pre-prompts not only changed its responses in questionnaires but also influenced its behavior in other tasks. In a two-armed bandit task, the anxiety-induction condition led to less exploitation and more exploration which –ultimately– led to fewer rewards than the happiness-induction condition. We furthermore found that emotion-induction conditions influenced behavior in a previously-established task measuring biases across different categories. Therein, the neutral condition worked best leading to the smallest overall bias. However, a big and robust difference between the two emotion-induction conditions emerged: the anxiety-induction condition caused substantially more biased answers than the happiness-induction condition.

What do we make of these results? It seems like GPT-3.5 generally performs best in the neutral condition, so a clear recommendation for prompt-engineering is to try and describe a problem as factually and neutrally as possible. However, if one does use emotive language, then our results show that anxiety-inducing scenarios lead to worse performance and substantially more biases. Of course, the neutral conditions asked GPT-3.5 to talk about something it knows, thereby possibly already contextualizing the prompts further in tasks that require knowledge and measure performance. However, that anxiety-inducing prompts can lead to more biased outputs could have huge consequences in applied scenarios. Large language models are, for example, already used in clinical settings and other high-stake contexts. If they produce higher biases in situations when a user speaks more anxiously, then their outputs could actually become dangerous. We have shown one method, which is to run psychiatric studies, that could capture and prevent such biases before they occur.

In the current work, we intended to show the utility of using computational psychiatry to understand foundation models. We observed that GPT-3.5 produced on average higher anxiety scores than human participants. One possible explanation for these results could be that GPT-3.5's training data, which consists of a lot of text taken from the internet, could have inherently shown such a bias, i.e. containing more anxious than happy statements. Of course, large language models have just become good enough to perform psychological tasks, and whether or not they intelligently perform them is still a matter of ongoing debate⁵⁷. Yet we believe that future iterations of large language models (and similar such architectures) could benefit from analyzing the resulting outputs using tools from computational psychiatry. For example, if a model shows, across many tasks, that it acts in a very selfish manner and responds to questionnaires in a way that seems to suggest high scores of megalomania, then engineers could think about possibly re-training or fine-tuning the model to ease its aberrant behavior. Using tools from psychiatry to understand large models was previously not possible, but we believe that its utility will only increase as these models become more powerful and –at the same time– more difficult to understand. Thus, we believe that computational psychiatry could play a crucial role in evaluating artificial agents in the nearby future¹⁷.

Yet another way in which psychiatry may inform large language models is via improved prompt-engineering. We know that large language models are sensitive to how a problem is presented to them, and researchers have started to exploit this feature to improve the capacity of these models by carefully crafting the prompts presented to them^{58,59}. In some sense, psychotherapy is just a form of prompt-engineering for humans. It may, therefore, be interesting to see whether insights from human psychiatry can be adapted to steer artificial systems to desired behaviors. We have hinted at one example of this in the present article, showing that neutral and happiness-inducing prompts lead to reduced biases, but clearly, these are only early steps toward this goal.

From a broader perspective, our work has been inspired by many recent attempts to better understand in-context learning. Recently, there has been a push towards creating benchmarks to assess the capability of foundation models^{56,59,60}, some of which we applied here. Part of this movement tries to investigate large language models using methods from the cognitive sciences. Examples include property induction⁶¹, thinking-out-loud protocols⁶², learning causal over-hypotheses⁶³, psycholinguistic completion⁶⁴, or affordance understanding⁶⁵. Therefore, our current work can be seen as part of a larger research program where methods from the behavioral sciences are used to understand capable black-box algorithms' learning and decision-making processes^{17,66–69}.

In conclusion, we have subjected GPT-3.5 to a set of tasks taken from the field of computational psychiatry. We found that GPT-3.5 can be influenced strongly by emotive language, especially if the prompts are intended to induce states of anxiety. The precise mechanisms of how these states map onto behavior, however, remains –similar to research on humans– unknown. We believe that to fully understand how and why these models behave and misbehave in the ways they do, we need to keep exploring them using every method available.

References

1. Brown, T. *et al.* Language models are few-shot learners. *Adv. Neural Inf. Process. Syst.* **33**, 1877–1901 (2020).
2. Lin, Z. *et al.* Caire: An end-to-end empathetic chatbot. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, vol. 34, 13622–13623 (2020).
3. Webb, T., Holyoak, K. J. & Lu, H. Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.09196* (2022).
4. Hendrycks, D. *et al.* Measuring mathematical problem solving with the math dataset. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2103.03874* (2021).
5. Han, J. M. *et al.* Unsupervised neural machine translation with generative language models only. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.05448* (2021).
6. Pang, B. *et al.* Long document summarization with top-down and bottom-up inference. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2203.07586* (2022).
7. Chambon, P., Bluethgen, C., Langlotz, C. P. & Chaudhari, A. Adapting pretrained vision-language foundational models to medical imaging domains, DOI: [10.48550/ARXIV.2210.04133](https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2210.04133) (2022).
8. Shah, D., Osinski, B., Ichter, B. & Levine, S. Lm-nav: Robotic navigation with large pre-trained models of language, vision, and action. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.04429* (2022).
9. Singh, C., Morris, J. X., Aneja, J., Rush, A. M. & Gao, J. Explaining patterns in data with language models via interpretable autoprompting. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.01848* (2022).
10. Ho, J. *et al.* Imagen video: High definition video generation with diffusion models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.02303* (2022).
11. Chen, M. *et al.* Evaluating large language models trained on code. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2107.03374* (2021).
12. Roose, K. A conversation with bing’s chatbot left me deeply unsettled. *New York Times* (2023).
13. Perez, F. & Ribeiro, I. Ignore previous prompt: Attack techniques for language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.09527* (2022).
14. Montague, P. R., Dolan, R. J., Friston, K. J. & Dayan, P. Computational psychiatry. *Trends cognitive sciences* **16**, 72–80 (2012).
15. Huys, Q. J., Maia, T. V. & Frank, M. J. Computational psychiatry as a bridge from neuroscience to clinical applications. *Nat. neuroscience* **19**, 404–413 (2016).
16. Binz, M. & Schulz, E. Using cognitive psychology to understand gpt-3. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* **120**, e2218523120 (2023).
17. Schulz, E. & Dayan, P. Computational psychiatry for computers. *Isience* **23**, 101772 (2020).
18. Liu, J. *et al.* What makes good in-context examples for gpt-3? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2101.06804* (2021).
19. Lampinen, A. K. *et al.* Can language models learn from explanations in context? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2204.02329* (2022).
20. OpenAI API. <https://beta.openai.com/overview>. Accessed: 2022-06-20.
21. Ree, M. J., French, D., MacLeod, C. & Locke, V. Distinguishing cognitive and somatic dimensions of state and trait anxiety: Development and validation of the state-trait inventory for cognitive and somatic anxiety (sticsa). *Behav. Cogn. Psychother.* **36**, 313–332 (2008).
22. Miotto, M., Rossberg, N. & Kleinberg, B. Who is gpt-3? an exploration of personality, values and demographics. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.14338* (2022).
23. Tavast, M., Kunnari, A. & Hämäläinen, P. Language models can generate human-like self-reports of emotion. In *27th International Conference on Intelligent User Interfaces*, 69–72 (2022).
24. Craske, M. G. *et al.* What is an anxiety disorder? *Focus* **9**, 369–388 (2011).
25. Lépine, J.-P. The epidemiology of anxiety disorders: prevalence and societal costs. *J. Clin. Psychiatry* **63**, 4–8 (2002).
26. Fan, H., Gershman, S. J. & Phelps, E. A. Trait somatic anxiety is associated with reduced directed exploration and underestimation of uncertainty. *Nat. Hum. Behav.* 1–12 (2022).
27. Mkrtchian, A., Aylward, J., Dayan, P., Roiser, J. P. & Robinson, O. J. Modeling avoidance in mood and anxiety disorders using reinforcement learning. *Biol. psychiatry* **82**, 532–539 (2017).

28. Wong, A. H. & Beckers, T. Trait anxiety is associated with reduced typicality asymmetry in fear generalization. *Behav. Res. Ther.* **138**, 103802 (2021).
29. Wong, A. H. & Lovibond, P. F. Excessive generalisation of conditioned fear in trait anxious individuals under ambiguity. *Behav. research therapy* **107**, 53–63 (2018).
30. Bishop, S. J. & Gagne, C. Anxiety, depression, and decision making: a computational perspective. *Annu. review neuroscience* **41**, 371–388 (2018).
31. Lu, Y., Bartolo, M., Moore, A., Riedel, S. & Stenetorp, P. Fantastically ordered prompts and where to find them: Overcoming few-shot prompt order sensitivity. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2104.08786* (2021).
32. Siedlecka, E. & Denson, T. F. Experimental methods for inducing basic emotions: A qualitative review. *Emot. Rev.* **11**, 87–97 (2019).
33. Rathsclag, M. & Memmert, D. The influence of self-generated emotions on physical performance: an investigation of happiness, anger, anxiety, and sadness. *J. Sport Exerc. Psychol.* **35**, 197–210 (2013).
34. Mills, C. & D’Mello, S. On the validity of the autobiographical emotional memory task for emotion induction. *PLoS one* **9**, e95837 (2014).
35. Bertram, L., Schulz, E. & Nelson, J. D. Subjective probability is modulated by emotions. *PsyArXiv* (2021).
36. Wiecki, T. V., Poland, J. & Frank, M. J. Model-based cognitive neuroscience approaches to computational psychiatry: clustering and classification. *Clin. Psychol. Sci.* **3**, 378–399 (2015).
37. Lester, D. The effect of fear and anxiety on exploration and curiosity: toward a theory of exploration. *The J. general psychology* **79**, 105–120 (1968).
38. Grupe, D. W. & Nitschke, J. B. Uncertainty and anticipation in anxiety: an integrated neurobiological and psychological perspective. *Nat. Rev. Neurosci.* **14**, 488–501 (2013).
39. Charpentier, C. J., Aylward, J., Roiser, J. P. & Robinson, O. J. Enhanced risk aversion, but not loss aversion, in unmedicated pathological anxiety. *Biol. psychiatry* **81**, 1014–1022 (2017).
40. Aberg, K. C., Toren, I. & Paz, R. A neural and behavioral trade-off between value and uncertainty underlies exploratory decisions in normative anxiety. *Mol. psychiatry* **27**, 1573–1587 (2022).
41. Bennett, D., Sutcliffe, K., Tan, N. P.-J., Smillie, L. D. & Bode, S. Anxious and obsessive-compulsive traits are independently associated with valuation of noninstrumental information. *J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.* **150**, 739 (2021).
42. Wilson, R. C., Geana, A., White, J. M., Ludvig, E. A. & Cohen, J. D. Humans use directed and random exploration to solve the explore–exploit dilemma. *J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.* **143**, 2074 (2014).
43. Schulz, E. & Gershman, S. J. The algorithmic architecture of exploration in the human brain. *Curr. Opin. Neurobiol.* **55**, 7–14 (2019).
44. Schulz, E., Wu, C. M., Ruggeri, A. & Meder, B. Searching for rewards like a child means less generalization and more directed exploration. *Psychol. Sci.* **30**, 1561–1572 (2019).
45. Gershman, S. J. Deconstructing the human algorithms for exploration. *Cognition* **173**, 34–42 (2018).
46. Binz, M. & Schulz, E. Modeling human exploration through resource-rational reinforcement learning. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems* (2022).
47. Dubois, M. & Hauser, T. U. Value-free random exploration is linked to impulsivity. *Nat. Commun.* **13**, 4542 (2022).
48. Liang, P. P., Wu, C., Morency, L.-P. & Salakhutdinov, R. Towards understanding and mitigating social biases in language models. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, 6565–6576 (PMLR, 2021).
49. Lucy, L. & Bamman, D. Gender and representation bias in gpt-3 generated stories. In *Proceedings of the Third Workshop on Narrative Understanding*, 48–55 (2021).
50. Bolukbasi, T., Chang, K.-W., Zou, J. Y., Saligrama, V. & Kalai, A. T. Man is to computer programmer as woman is to homemaker? debiasing word embeddings. *Adv. neural information processing systems* **29** (2016).
51. Mökander, J., Schuett, J., Kirk, H. R. & Floridi, L. Auditing large language models: a three-layered approach. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.08500* (2023).
52. Abid, A., Farooqi, M. & Zou, J. Persistent anti-muslim bias in large language models. In *Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society*, 298–306 (2021).

53. Banks, A. J. & Hicks, H. M. Fear and implicit racism: Whites' support for voter id laws. *Polit. Psychol.* **37**, 641–658 (2016).
54. Schneider, L. J. Supplementary materials [researchdata] to: Stereotyping, prejudice, and the role of anxiety for compensatory control. *PsychOpenGOLD* (2022).
55. Li, T., Khot, T., Khashabi, D., Sabharwal, A. & Srikumar, V. Uncovering stereotyping biases via underspecified questions. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2010.02428* (2020).
56. Srivastava, A. *et al.* Beyond the imitation game: Quantifying and extrapolating the capabilities of language models, DOI: [10.48550/ARXIV.2206.04615](https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2206.04615) (2022).
57. Shiffrin, R. & Mitchell, M. Probing the psychology of ai models. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* **120**, e2300963120 (2023).
58. Reynolds, L. & McDonell, K. Prompt programming for large language models: Beyond the few-shot paradigm. In *Extended Abstracts of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 1–7 (2021).
59. Kojima, T., Gu, S. S., Reid, M., Matsuo, Y. & Iwasawa, Y. Large language models are zero-shot reasoners. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.11916* (2022).
60. Bommasani, R. *et al.* On the opportunities and risks of foundation models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.07258* (2021).
61. Han, S. J., Ransom, K., Perfors, A. & Kemp, C. Human-like property induction is a challenge for large language models. *PsyArXiv* (2022).
62. Betz, G., Richardson, K. & Voigt, C. Thinking aloud: Dynamic context generation improves zero-shot reasoning performance of gpt-2. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2103.13033* (2021).
63. Kosoy, E. *et al.* Towards understanding how machines can learn causal overhypotheses, DOI: [10.48550/ARXIV.2206.08353](https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2206.08353) (2022).
64. Ettinger, A. What bert is not: Lessons from a new suite of psycholinguistic diagnostics for language models. *Transactions Assoc. for Comput. Linguist.* **8**, 34–48 (2020).
65. Jones, C. R. *et al.* Distributional semantics still can't account for affordances. In *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society*, vol. 44 (2022).
66. Rich, A. S. & Gureckis, T. M. Lessons for artificial intelligence from the study of natural stupidity. *Nat. Mach. Intell.* **1**, 174–180 (2019).
67. Rahwan, I. *et al.* Machine behaviour. *Nature* **568**, 477–486 (2019).
68. Schramowski, P., Turan, C., Andersen, N., Rothkopf, C. A. & Kersting, K. Large pre-trained language models contain human-like biases of what is right and wrong to do. *Nat. Mach. Intell.* **4**, 258–268 (2022).
69. Hagendorff, T. Machine psychology: Investigating emergent capabilities and behavior in large language models using psychological methods. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.13988* (2023).